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Abstract
A special case of dollarization is analyzed: quotation of prices in dollars. The proposed
explanation is price stickiness: when price adjustment is costly, rms can prefer to x their
prices in a stable foreign currency rather than in an unstable domestic one in order to avoid
frequent price changes.
The proposed model shows how the choice of price-setting currency made by a rm depends
on the in
ation rate, exchange rate volatility, the pricing currency of competitors and input
suppliers, and the shape of the demand function. The model predicts that there are two Nash
equilibria in the economy populated by symmetric rms: an equilibrium with uniform ruble
pricing and an equilibrium with uniform dollar pricing.
It is shown that in economy with less competition a smaller increase in in
ation is needed
to make an individual rm deviate from the equilibrium with uniform ruble pricing and turn to
pricing in dollars.
Levina is an economist at CEFIR; Zamulin is an Assistant Professor at NES and CEFIR. The authors thank
Konstantin Styrin for many thoughtful insights throughout the writing of this paper. They can be contacted at
Nakhimovskiy prospekt, 47, Oce 720, Moscow 117418, Russia, or at ilevina@cer.ru and ozamulin@nes.ru.
1Q: What is the dierence between one dollar and one ruble?
A: One dollar.
(A Russian joke of early 1990s)
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes a particular form of dollarization - quotation of prices of goods and services
in dollars instead of local currency. Such practice became widespread in Russia during the early
years of transition when in
ation was persistently high; it is still popular today, although in
ation
became much lower. It should be noted that the practice of quotation of prices in a foreign currency
does not require any actual use of that currency: in most cases transactions are still carried out in
the domestic currency, and the foreign money is used solely as a unit of account.
Previous theoretical research on dollarization was mainly focused on the relative money demand
for domestic and foreign money. Such approach is useful to capture the use of foreign money as
a store of value: to make savings, individuals choose assets denominated in the currency, which
yields the higher expected return. The store of value function of money is, to some extent, linked to
its means of exchange function: people can often nd it more convenient to conduct the big-ticket
transactions in the currency in which they hold their savings. Hence, the standard approach can,
at least partly, explain the use of foreign currency as a means of exchange. However, it hardly
helps to understand the use of foreign currency as a unit of account (see Calvo and Vegh (1996)
for the survey of the theoretical research on dollarization). In this sense, our paper complements
the existing research on dollarization by analyzing its relevance to this last remaining function of
money - unit of account. However, since this form of dollarization is quite dierent in its nature
from what is usually studied in this literature, we label the phenomenon of quoting prices in foreign
currency as "foreign currency pricing," further denoted FCP.
We explain the rms' decision to denominate prices in dollars as a case of price stickiness. At the
times of high in
ation, quoting prices in the domestic currency would require frequent price adjust-
ments. If price adjustment is costly due to some sort of menu costs, sellers can prefer to denominate
prices for their products in a stable foreign currency, which allows keeping prices unchanged for
a much longer period. However, the strategy of switching individually to a dierent price-setting
2currency has certain drawbacks, making a rm vulnerable to 
uctuations of the exchange rate,
which can throw the rm's price rather far from the prices of others.
The model presented in the paper shows how the choice of the price-setting currency made
by an individual imperfectly competitive rm is determined by the following features of the envi-
ronment: the relation between the in
ation rate and the exchange rate volatility, the currency in
which competitors set prices, and the currency in which inputs are priced. The pricing strategy of
competitors is important for the rm's decision in the case of a high degree of real price rigidity in
the sense of Ball and Romer (1990). This real rigidity is introduced in the paper as a smoothed-out
kink in the demand curve, following Kimball (1995). Such a demand curve makes rms desire to
keep their prices close to those of the competitors.
It is pointed in Calvo and Vegh (1996) that dollarization in the standard understanding of
the word typically appears to exhibit "hysteresis," in the sense that the degree of dollarization
(measured as the proportion of foreign currency deposits in broad money) does not fall immediately
in response to a reduction in in
ation. Although there is no consensus in explaining hysteresis for
this type of dollarization 1, hysteresis in the foreign currency pricing is easy to explain. Our model
predicts that the rms, which turn to dollar pricing during high in
ation period, can continue
denominating prices in dollars long after the stabilization of in
ation. The source of hysteresis in
the model is multiple equilibria, which arise when rms try to avoid large deviations of their price
from the prices of competitors: no rm would decide to switch to a dierent price-setting currency
individually even if the in
ation environment changes.
Finally, it is shown in the model that the level of competition has an important in
uence on
the choice of price-setting currency made by the rms within the economy. In a less competitive
economy a lower in
ation rate is needed to make rms switch to dollar pricing. This nding
is consistent with an informal observations that the more expensive luxury items, such as fancy
restaurants, have been practicing FCP most vigorously. These services could be thought as being
less competitive.
In a way, the paper is related not so much to the literature on dollarization, but rather to the
1Among the most popular explanations attempts are those based on the role of nancial adaptation (Dornbusch
and Reynoso 1989, Dornbusch, Sturzenegger and Wolf 1990)), costs of switching to a dierent currency (Guidotti
and Rodriguez 1992, Sturzenegger 1993), optimal portfolio considerations under the assumption of perfect capital
mobility (Calvo and Vegh 1996)).
3debate on local currency pricing (LCP) versus producer currency pricing (PCP) in the modern "New
open economy macroeconomics" paradigm (see Lane (1991) for a survey). Thus, foreign currency
pricing can be thought of as an extreme case of producer currency pricing in that literature, in the
sense that FCP implies perfect exchange rate pass-through not only for imports, but potentially
for all goods in the economy, even nontradable ones. Hence, FCP may have strong implications for
monetary policy and exchange rate volatility, which should be low in this case to allow consumption
smoothing. Within the LCP-PCP debate, a paper analogous to ours is Friberg (1998). The
dierence, however, is that Friberg studies the choice of currency, in which to price imports, based
purely on exchange rate uncertainty with price being predetermined but not necessarily rigid.
In contrast, we concentrate on the role of in
ation and exchange rate volatility in sticky-price
environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 demonstrates existence of multiple
equilibria in a simple reduced-form example, where rms suer quadratic losses from deviating
from the optimal price. In the example, we ignore the issue of input pricing, and concentrate solely
on in
ation rate, exchange rate volatility, and the pricing currency of competitors. In this example,
the result is that a dollar-pricing economy would never revert back to local currency, even if in
ation
is brought to zero. In the section 4 we extend the model to include prices of inputs, real rigidity,
and endogenous rate of price adjustment. In this section we demonstrate that the most important
factor determining the pricing currency is the denomination of input prices, especially in the case
of constant elasticity of demand, which makes the optimal price be a constant mark-up over the
input price, independently of the pricing strategy of the competitors. However, this tendency can
be countered by a suciently strong real rigidity in the form of a smoothed out kink in the demand
curve, which makes the prices of competitors matter. Section 5 concludes.
2 Some facts
Although this paper is a theoretical exercise, we motivate our analysis with a snapshot of several
product groups in Moscow. Table 1 demonstrates, in which currencies sellers in Moscow denominate
their prices among 20 dierent product groups. These numbers were obtained by making phone
calls to 20 sellers among each of these product groups, picking them at random from the Yellow
4Table 1: Pricing currencies for some product groups
Number Product % in rubles % in dollars
1 Advertising 0% 100%
2 Bank equipment 5% 95%
3 Ward robes 15% 85%
4 Keyboards 20% 80%
5 Auto body repair 25% 75%
6 Translation 30% 70%
7 Lamps 43% 57%
8 Home improvement 55% 45%
9 Aerobics classes 56% 44%
10 Plumbing supplies 57% 43%
11 English classes 58% 42%
12 Restaurants 60% 40%
13 Oce furniture 67% 33%
14 Glass installation 75% 25%
15 Wash machines 77% 23%
16 Freezers 85% 15%
17 Refrigerators 95% 5%
18 Lunch deliveries 100% 0%
19 Notary services 100% 0%
20 Garages 100% 0%
The numbers were obtained by phone calls to 20 sellers within each of these groups in
Moscow in the fall of 2001. The sellers were picked at random from the Yellow Pages.
Pages. Each of the sellers was asked how much a certain product costs, and then we noted, in
which currency the seller announced the price. From the table we see that pricing in dollars is
widespread but not dominant. In advertising, everything is priced in dollars, while lunch deliveries,
notary services, and garages, were all priced in rubles. The other product groups had mixed
representation of both types of pricing. This table may seem to contradict our theoretical result
that in equilibrium everyone should turn to one currency. This is likely to be explained by low
homogeneity within these product groups - if we decomposed restaurants into cheap and expensive
ones, we would see that the latter category would be almost uniformly dollar pricing.
An example of markets which are clearly stuck in dierent equilibria is apartment markets in
dierent cities. Some Russian cities, such as Moscow, St.Petersburg, Kaliningrad, Tver, and Nizhniy
Novgorod, have been pricing their apartments almost exclusively in dollars. Other cities, such as
Novosibirsk, Omsk, Perm, and Ulyanovsk have been pricing in rubles. Figure 2 demonstrates that
































Source: The Russian Guild of Realtors.
such pricing lead to drastically dierent behavior of prices, determined by their denomination,
following the large devaluation of ruble and output collapse in August 1998.
It is easy to think of other groups of goods, which are priced predominantly in dollars. For
example, Russian internet stores have their price lists predominantly in dollars. Many stores put
dollar prices on the internet, while at the same time quoting ruble prices in the stores themselves.
This type of behavior suggests that stores perhaps would like to price in dollars, but prefer not to
do so, because they need a special permission from the city of Moscow. Yet, their ruble prices may
be directly tied to a certain xed dollar value, which they count for themselves and quote on the
internet.
63 Expected losses from price stickiness in a simple framework
Here we investigate the relative losses of a rm that sets the price of its product in either rubles or
dollars in either dollarized environment (when all other rms price in dollars) or in an environment
when everyone else sets prices in local currency (hereafter rubles). These losses will be assessed and
compared along the steady-state path with a constant rate of in
ation. The theoretical framework
is that of Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988), where a continuum of small monopolisticaly competitive
rms produce dierentiated products and set prices in a staggered fashion. The deviation from that
model is that money supply grows at a constant predictable rate , so that in case all rms price
in local currency, the economy follows a steady-state path, even though the prices are sticky. That
is, in a staggered price setting environment, the aggregation across rms guarantees a smooth rate
of in
ation and constant output according to the quantity equation
yt = mt   pt; (1)
where y is log output, m is log money supply and p is the log aggregate price level, and constant
velocity is normalized to unity. Normalizing the initial price level and the output to unity as well,
and hence their logarithm to zero, we get
pt = mt = t:
An important assumption is made about the path of the exchange rate e. Although the rate
is expected to follow the price level according to the PPP hypothesis, it is allowed to 
uctuate
randomly around that trend. So in every period, the log exchange rate is distributed according to
et  (t;2):
Note that if all of the rms in the economy set their prices in dollars, then the general price
level 
uctuates as well, and so does the output by (1). If all prices are set in rubles, however, the
price level is smooth and output is constant.
The form of price stickiness is assumed to be as in Calvo (1983). That is, each rm gets a
signal to adjust its price at a stochastic rate . Then, at each moment of time, the rm's losses are







7where pi;t is the price charged by the rm i, and p
#
t is the instantaneously optimal "desired" price
(identical for all rms), given by the standard expression
p
#
t   pt = (yt    y); (3)
where  y is the full employment output, here equal to zero, and  is a measure of "real rigidity."
Let us now turn to the examination of the four distinct cases: pricing in dollars and rubles in
the dollar and ruble pricing environment.
3.1 Pricing in rubles with everyone else pricing in rubles.
First of all, when everyone prices in rubles, the loss function can be expressed in terms of deviation
from the aggregate price level, as it is simultaneously the desired price. This can be seen from (3)
and the fact that with pricing in rubles output is constant at the full employment level.








(1   )t(pi   pt)2: (4)
Thus, the rm chooses a constant price pi to minimize losses incurred while this price is in eect. We
call this the "reset" price, as this is the price, which the rms chooses once given a stochastic signal
to adjust. In principle, the subscript i is not needed, because any rm adjusting its price at time t
would choose the same reset price. Yet, since we concentrate on prot losses of an individual rm,
we keep the subscript for tractability reasons. The future losses are discounted by the probability
of the price still being in eect at t, equal to (1   )t. E0 denotes expectation at time zero, which
in this case in unnecessary because the problem is entirely deterministic.
The solution to the minimization problem is obtained remembering that pt = t and observing
that
P1
t=0(1   )t = 1
 and
P1
t=0 t(1   )t = 1 
2 . The resultant optimal reset price at time zero






Thus, we see that the price depends positively on the in
ation rate, which is quite intuitive: the
optimal price is a weighted average of future optimal prices, which are expected to be higher the
higher the in
ation rate. Likewise, a higher  implies lower price because the expected length of
8time for this price to remain in eect is smaller, and hence, future high aggregate price level is
discounted more heavily.
Plugging the expression for p into (4), and observing that
P1
t=0 t2(1   )t =
(2 )(1 )
3 , we






Here, Lrr stands for "losses with pricing in rubles when others price in rubles." Again, it is quite
intuitive that these losses depend positively on the rate of in
ation, and negatively on the rate of
price adjustment.
3.2 Pricing in dollars with everyone else pricing in rubles










(1   )t(et + p
f
i   pt)2: (5)
Here, the rm i sets a constant price p
f
i , and the ruble price is then et+p
f
i , which on average grows
in line with the optimal price, but with deviations of the size determined by the variance of the




Thus, there is perfect certainty-equivalence here, which, of course, comes from the assumption of
quadratic loss: the rm sets the price at the current optimum, as the ruble price is expected to
grow with that optimum. The variability of the ruble price does not aect the decision. Plugging
this zero into (5) and noting that E0e2







As expected, the losses depend on the variability of the exchange rate, but not on the in
ation rate.
3.3 Pricing in rubles with everyone else pricing in dollars
When general pricing is in dollars, output is no longer constant, and the aggregate price level is no
longer equivalent to the desired price. Instead, since pt = et,  yt = mt   t = 0, while yt = mt   et,
9the desired price is obtained from (3) to be
p
#
t = et + (t   et) = t + (1   )et:








(1   )t(pi   t   (1   )et)2: (6)






which is exact same as the price quoted by a rm pricing in rubles in ruble environment (Section
3.1). Again, with certainty equivalence only expectations matter.











The rst term in the brackets is the same as before and represents the losses from not keeping up
with in
ation. The second term is additional losses associated with being away from the group.
That is, in a competitive environment, the rm incurs losses not only because the rm is away
from the full-employment output but also because the rm is away from everyone else. Here, the
aggregate price level 
uctuates with the exchange rate, but the rm i does not adjust its price, and
hence its relative price is highly variable. Losses thus caused are especially big for low values of
, which makes sense: low  implies strong real rigidity, that is, each rm's optimal price is more
dictated by everyone's prices rather than by the aggregate demand. Such a situation is likely to
occur in a more competitive system, as stressed in Calvo (2000).
3.4 Pricing in dollars with everyone else pricing in dollars
This last possibility is quite straight-forward as all of the relevant issues have been discussed already.












i   t + et)2; (7)
the optimal price is p
f







10Here, once again, the losses depend on the value of , this time positively. Again, a low  means
that rms would not want to deviate from each other much, and this is precisely what is achieved
when everyone prices in dollars: even though all are away from the full employment price, all
are together, and hence the losses are small. If  is large, on the other hand, aggregate demand
is a bigger consideration than the relative price, and so the losses from 
uctuating far from the
steady-state are large.
3.5 Comparing the losses
Summarizing the above ndings, we get the following table of the expected losses:
Table 2: Comparison of expected losses
All prices in





















One important result is that it is impossible to say whether uniform pricing in dollars is better
or worse than uniform pricing in rubles. Comparison of E0Lrr and E0Ldd depends on the values of
the in
ation rate, exchange rate volatility, and the degree of real rigidity. Of course, an argument
can be made that such comparison is dicult because the volatility of the exchange rate should be
in
uenced by the choice of the economy to price in dollars.
The most sticking result, however, is that E0Lrd > E0Ldd for reasonable values of , that is,
whenever  < 1=2 with  = 0. This implies that if everyone in the economy prices in dollars,
then no rm will choose to switch to rubles even if in
ation is brought to zero. This is once again
caused by the fact that in a competitive environment rms lose more from being away from others
rather than being away from full employment output. At the same time, if in
ation is brought to
a low enough level, all rms would benet from an organized switch to ruble pricing. Thus, we
face a situation of multiple equilibria, where the economy can be stuck at a dominated dollarized
equilibrium indenitely. It would take a coordinated action to jump to a dominant one.
Note that the same is true in the opposite direction, but not to the same extent. In a ruble
11environment, a rm would choose to switch to dollar pricing unilaterally as soon as  > 
p
1   
(this is the condition for E0Ldr < E0Lrr). Thus, with high enough in
ation, the economy will
switch to dollar pricing. However, all rms would benet from a coordinated switch at yet a
lower value of in
ation as E0Ldd < E0Lrr whenever  > 
p
1   . Between these two levels of
in
ation, the economy would once again be stuck at a dominated equilibrium.
4 Introducing input costs
The drawback of the model proposed in Section 3 is that it does not take into account the denom-
ination of input prices, and is hardly in line with the empirical facts. Thus, reasonable parameter
values would suggest that all prices in Russia should be now denominated in dollars; yet, we observe
such practice only with respect to a fraction of goods and services, as shown in Table 1. Besides, it
is clear that a signicant portion of inputs (say, electricity or transportation) is priced according to
ruble-denominated state-controlled taris. Hence, in this section we develop a model, which allows
explicit modelling of input pricing. In this model we also endogenize the rate of price adjustment.
A principle methodological dierence in this section is that we turn to continuous time, which
makes the optimization easier and allows analytical solutions. As in Section 3, we allow the exchange
rate to 
uctuate randomly around the in
ation trend. Formally, we assume that log exchange rate
et follows the continuous-time mean reverting process:
d(et   t) =  (et   t)dt + dz ;
e0 = 0;
where dz is an increment of a Wiener process. Thus, the exchange rate follows a standard Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process. If  = 1 then the process looks very much like the white noise around the trend
assumed in Section 3. It will be shown, however, that the more realistic assumption of slower
mean-reversion with  > 1 will not make a qualitative dierence.
If e0 = 0, then the log exchange rate the conditional distribution of log rate et is normal (see,
for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994)):









As t increases the variance of the log rate converges to 2
2, which is the unconditional variance of
the process.
12Beside the aggregate price level P we introduce the aggregate price of inputs used in the
production process PI. Both prices can be denominated either in rubles or in dollars, the logs of
ruble values of P and PI at every moment t are given by
pt =
(
t if rm's competitors quote prices in rubles




t if rm's inputs are denominated in rubles
et if they are denominated in dollars.
Thus, we assume that the input price grows with the general in
ation, the only question is whether
they grow monotonically or 
uctuate with the exchange rate. An alternative would be to allow
stickiness in the input price as well, by letting PI be xed in a certain currency, during the period
when the output price is xed. Such a specication would arguably be more realistic if the input
were a single intermediate good. More likely, however, the single input is a composite of many goods,
and hence its price should grow with in
ation. The volatility of the input price then depends on
the fraction of these inputs priced in dollars.
We also introduce an explicit "menu cost" F of changing the price, which will allow us to
determine the rate of price adjustment endogenously. This endogeneity is especially valuable,
because the ruble-pricing rms are likely to change their prices more frequently facing a positive
rate of in
ation. The last dierence from Section 3 is that the time interval , during which the
price is xed, remains constant, not stochastic, once chosen by a rm. This interval here is the
analog of 1=, the expected length of time during which a price remained xed in the stochastic
case. Thus, this xed interval specication is a special case of the stochastic rate with zero variance,
provided that the timing of price adjustments by individual rms is spread evenly over time.2























Instead of choosing an exact analytical expression for Q(pi), we describe the function implicitly
through the elasticity of demand for rm's output with respect to its relative price, (Pi=P) =
 
@ lnQ(Pi=P)
@ ln(Pi=P) , around the steady state Pi
P = 1. Furthermore, following Kimball (1995), we allow the
2The problem with such a specication is that in equilibrium all rms would prefer to adjust prices simultaneously,
so an equilibrium with a uniform distribution of price adjustment in time is not stable. However, such an assumption
makes further calculations simpler.
13individual demand curves to have a smoothed-out kink at the steady state rm's relative price. This
particular form of "real rigidity" implies that it is easier for a rm to lose customers by raising its
relative price above unity than to attract new customers by lowering its relative price below unity.
In terms of the elasticity of demand this means that around the steady state elasticity (Pi=P) is
an increasing function of the relative price. Hence, we characterize the demand function by two
parameters: the elasticity of demand at the unity relative price (1), and the (non-negative) rate
of change in elasticity with the deviations of relative price from unity
0(1)
(1)  0. When
0(1)
(1) is big,
rms do not want to deviate from others.
We assume that real costs faced by a rm are given by a linear cost function: c(Q) = a PI
P  Q.














































i =P) 1 is the optimal mark-up over the marginal cost. We assume that
the desired mark-up M(P
#
i =P) is a non-increasing function of the desired relative price. Then









Finally, we assume that the xed price does not deviate far from the instantaneously optimal
trajectory, which means that (p
#
i   pi) is small, and that volatility of the exchange rate is small
enough, so that relative prices do not 
uctuate too much. Then, as it is shown in Appendix A, the
corresponding 
uctuations of rm's instantaneously desired price around unity (p
#
i   p) are also
small, which allows us to employ the standard second order approximations.
144.1 The Desired Price Trajectory
Log-linearizing equation (10) around unity we can approximate the log rm's instantaneously de-
sired price as a weighted average of logs of the competitors' and input prices:
p
#















The elasticity of the desired mark-up at the unity desired relative price re
ects the curvature of the
smoothed-out kink of the demand function. It can be expressed in terms of elasticity of demand at







Formulas (11) - (13) are derived in Appendix B. The interpretation of the parameter  is once
again the degree of real rigidity, similarly to  in Section 3. The parameter  shows how much the
desired price depends on the prices of competitors relative to the marginal cost.
We see from (13) that
M0(1)
M(1) is non-positive: when a rm's relative price grows, its desired mark-
up declines or stays the same. Therefore, 0 <   1, which implies that the rm's instantaneously
desired price depends positively on the input price and non-negatively on the price of competitors.
The result that the price of competitors can in
uence the rm's desired price stems from the
specic assumption about the shape of the demand curve. Under the standard assumption of
constant elasticity of demand (
0(1)
(1) = 0 and, hence,  = 1) the rm's desired price is equal to a
constant markup over the marginal cost, thus, the optimal price trajectory of an individual rm is
not aected by the pricing strategies of the competitors.
However, if the demand curve has a suciently steep smoothed-out kink at the rm's optimal
relative price, a small increase in relative price can lead to a sensible reduction in the market share
while a similar decline in relative price would lead only to a small increase in the market share.
Then, random 
uctuations of the rm's relative price around unity have on average a negative
eect on the rm's prots. Thus, calculating the desired price trajectory, an individual rm is
heeding not only the time-path of its marginal cost, but also tries to avoid large random deviations
15from the price trajectory of the competitors. The willingness of an individual rm to keep in line
with others is the source of the multiplicity of equilibria, which was obtained in Section 3, and will
be obtained here as well. High sensitivity of the markup here corresponds to a low value of  in
Section 3.
4.2 Losses from Costly Price Adjustment
When price adjustment is costly, a prot-maximizing rm xes its price for a certain period of
time, instead of changing it at every instant. Thus, the rm incurs prot losses from two sources:
deviation of price from the desired trajectory during the period the price is kept xed in either
currency, and the costly price change.
In the described setup the second-order approximation for the instantaneous prot losses from


























Expressions (14)-(15) are derived in Appendix C.
With a continuous stochastic process for the exchange rate, the expectation as of period 0
of rm's accumulated prot losses from price non-optimality during each episode of xed price
depends on the expectation as of period 0 of distribution of the exchange rate at the beginning of
this episode. Furthermore, these episodes are not independent, since the rm's expectation about
the exchange rate at the beginning of the next period of xed price depends on the current value
of the exchange rate. Therefore, an optimizing rm, when choosing the pricing currency, at period
0 should make expectations about its prot losses during each episode of xed price.
If a rm denominates its price in rubles, its expected, at the time of kth price adjustment,
accumulated losses from price non-optimality during the period between the k-th and (k + 1)-th
price changes are equal to
LRub









16where pik is log rm's xed ruble price during this period. At time 0, the rm chooses the sequence
of optimal ruble prices fpikgj
1
k=1 and the optimal length of time between price changes  that








  n X
k=0
LRub
k (pik) + nF
!#
(17)
Similarly, if a rm denominates its price in dollars, its expected, as of period 0, losses from price

















ik is log rm's dollar price between the k-th and (k+1)-th price changes. The rm chooses







and the optimal length of time between price changes


















The rm chooses the currency to quote prices in by comparing expected losses per unit of time
associated with either pricing strategy.
4.3 Analyzing the Results
The solution to the optimization problems (17) and (19) is shown in Appendix D. We summarize
the results below.
i. If a rm quotes its price in rubles the optimal length of time between the price changes 
and optimal set of the reset prices fp















Naturally, the optimal length of time between the price adjustments  declines with in
ation:
with a higher in
ation a rm has to revise its price more frequently in order to keep in line with
the growing prices of competitors and growing input prices. Substituting expression for  into the
expression for the optimal reset price p
ik we see that the optimal reset price depends positively on
in
ation as before.
17Table 3: Losses associated with ruble and dollar pricing
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LossDoll = 0
Note that neither the optimal length of time between the price changes nor the reset price
depends on the pricing strategies of competitors and input suppliers. Only the in
ation rate and
the parameters of the demand function in
uence the rm's choice of the reset ruble price and
frequency of its adjustment. Again, due to certainty equivalence, variance does not matter.
ii. If a rm denominates its price in dollars, the optimal length of time between the price
changes f and the optimal sequence of the reset dollar prices fp
f
ik g are given by
f = 1 ; p
f
ik = 0 for all k:
Under the assumption of stable zero dollar in
ation a rm does not need to adjust its dollar
price, instead it xes the price at the optimal unity level once and for all. This replicates the result
obtained in Section 3. Note that in the case of dollar pricing, precisely as in the case of pricing
in rubles, the patterns of price adjustment by an individual rm are not aected by the choice of
price-setting currencies by the rm's competitors and input suppliers.
iii. The individual rm's expected prot losses per unit of time associated with either pricing-
in-rubles or pricing-in-dollars strategy under the dierent pricing strategies of the competitors and
input suppliers are summarized in Table 3.   1
4 (6F)
2
3 is a constant coecient.
We see that losses associated with ruble pricing increase with in
ation: under the higher rate
of in
ation an individual rm has to revise its price more frequently to keep it in line with other
prices. Higher volatility of the exchange rate (higher values of the marginal variance of log rate 2
2)
also increases losses from ruble pricing if either rm's competitors or its input suppliers, or both
of them denominate prices in dollars. Then, the instantaneously desired price, determined by the
input and competitors' prices, 
uctuates around the in
ation trend together with the exchange
18rate, and the ruble pricing strategy does not allow a rm to adjust its price to these 
uctuations.
Losses from dollar pricing do not depend on in
ation since the expected exchange rate is assumed
to follow the in
ation trend. They increase in the exchange rate volatility in the case when either
rm's competitors, or input suppliers, or both of them denominate their prices in rubles. Then,

uctuations of the rm's xed dollar price exceed in size the 
uctuations of the instantaneously
desired price, the average dierence between the two prices depends on the volatility of the exchange
rate. Hence, the higher the volatility, the larger are the deviations of the actual dollar price from
the desired level due to the 
uctuations of the exchange rate, the bigger the prot losses.
Note that the individual rm's losses associated with dollar pricing strategy are zero if everyone
in the economy denominates price in dollars. In this case the desired price, determined by the price
of competitors and input price, stays constant in dollars. Then, having once xed its dollar price
at the optimal level a rm does not have to adjust this price any more: the time-path of this price
exactly follows the trajectory of the desired price. Therefore, the rm does not incur any losses
from price non-optimality nor from the costly price change.
4.4 Choice of the Price-setting Currency
An individual rm chooses the pricing currency by comparing expected prot losses per unit of
time associated with each strategy. Since losses from ruble pricing increase in in
ation and losses
from dollar pricing do not depend on the in
ation rate, there always exists a unique threshold value
of in
ation, which corresponds to the switch of an individual rm from pricing in rubles to pricing
in dollars.
The expressions for the threshold values of in
ation ^  under the dierent pricing strategies of
the rm's competitors and input suppliers are presented in Table 4. The rst and second subscripts
of the threshold values ^  correspond to the currencies of denomination of the input and competitors'
prices respectively (R - rubles, D - dollars). Zero threshold values indicate that an individual rm
will prefer to quote its price in dollars even if in
ation is reduced to zero.
Table 4 also demonstrates that exchange rate volatility makes rms desire to price in rubles,
that is, threshold values of in
ation increase in . This is always the case whenever the threshold
is above zero. The threshold is zero, on the other hand, when losses from ruble pricing are always
higher due to pricing strategy of competitors and suppliers.
19Table 4: Threshold values of in
ation






























2 K3 if  < 1
2
0 if   1
2
^ DD = 0
For any currency of denomination of the input prices two equilibria exist:
- equilibrium with the uniform ruble pricing exists when  < ^ :R
- equilibrium with the uniform dollar pricing exists when  > ^ :D
The areas of existence of the equilibria with the uniform ruble pricing and uniform dollar pricing
can be illustrated by the following diagrams:
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^ DD ^ DR
We see that under the increasing in
ation an economy, sooner or later, switches from ruble
pricing to the uniform pricing in dollars. As it is seen from Table 4, if the input price is denomi-
nated in dollars, the lower rate of in
ation is enough to push the economy into the dollar pricing
equilibrium, which is quite reasonable, as the rm's desired price trajectory is aected by the input
price.
An important result is that exit from the equilibrium with uniform dollar pricing when in
ation
drops is possible only if the input price is denominated in rubles. If the input price is denominated in
dollars rms incur zero prot losses quoting uniformly their prices in dollars. Then, even reduction
of in
ation to zero will not make individual rm deviate from the group and turn back to pricing
in rubles.
204.5 The Hysteresis Eect
Informal observations in Russia and other countries (for example, Israel) suggest that FCP exhibits
hysteresis: during high in
ation rms turn to quoting prices in dollars but reduction of in
ation
does not immediately push rms back to the local currency. Firms can continue denominating
prices in dollars after the stabilization of in
ation.
The presented model captures this eect. With the assumption of non-constant elasticity of
demand ( < 1) the model predicts hysteresis: as we can see from Table 4, the threshold value
of in
ation which corresponds to the fall of the economy into the equilibrium with uniform dollar
pricing ^ :R, unless it is zero, exceeds the threshold value which corresponds to the exit from
dollar-pricing equilibrium ^ :D:
^ :R > ^ :D when ^ :R > 0:
The source of hysteresis in the model is again the desire of an individual rm to keep in line with
the group, which stems from the assumption about the shape of the demand curve. When the
demand curve has a smoothed-out kink at the rm's optimal relative price, random deviations of
an individual price from the aggregate price of competitors are associated with prot losses for a
rm.
Note, that under the traditional assumption of constant elasticity of demand ( = 1) no hys-
teresis is predicted by the model: there is one and the same threshold value of in
ation which is
associated with both, the fall into and the exit from the equilibrium with uniform dollar pricing:
^ :R = ^ :D . With constant elasticity of demand the rm's optimal price at every moment is equal
to a constant markup over its marginal cost and, therefore, the pricing strategy of an individual
rm is determined in full by the pricing strategy of its input suppliers and is not aected at all by
the pricing strategy of competitors. Hence, an individual rm quotes its price in dollars whenever
its costs are denominated in dollars and chooses between the ruble and dollar pricing, comparing
the in
ation rate and the exchange rate volatility, when its costs are denominated in rubles.
Thus, only introduction of a demand function with a smoothed-out kink at the rm's opti-
mal relative price, as in Kimball (1995), allows to capture the hysteresis eect in the imperfectly
competitive framework.
214.6 The In
uence of Market Power
The relation between the areas of existence of the equilibria with uniform ruble and dollar pricing,
and, respectively, the degree of hysteresis, depend on the coecients  and K. By equation (11),
 relates the rm's instantaneously desired relative price to the prices of competitors and input
suppliers; according to approximation (14), K shows the magnitude of prot losses from price non-
optimality. These two coecients are determined by the shape of the demand function around the
steady state relative price pi = 1, they are expressed in terms of the rm's desired mark-up at the
unity desired relative price M(1), and the rate of change in the desired mark-up with the deviations
of desired relative price from unity
M0(1)
M(1) .
Both, the desired mark-up at the unity relative price M(1) and the rate of change in the mark-
up around unity
M0(1)
M(1) , are related to the rm's market power . With higher market power rms
are less sensitive to the deviations from others, this implies higher desired mark-up and lower (in












Then, from expression (12) for the coecient  we see that  is a non-declining function of
market power:
@
@  0. This suggests that when market power is suciently high the desired
price trajectory of an individual rm is determined primarily by the price of inputs, the price of
competitors has only a moderate in
uence on the desired pricing strategy. However, if the market
power is low a rm incurs sensible losses from the deviations from the group, therefore, choosing
the desired price trajectory, it pays attention not only to the input price but also to the price of
competitors. From expression (15) for the coecient K we have @K
@ < 0. Thus, with the higher
market power the deviations of an individual price from its instantaneously optimal level become
less costly for a rm.









< 0 if ^ DR > 0:
The signs of the derivatives imply that the fall into the equilibrium with uniform dollar pricing is
easier in a more monopolized economy: lower values of in
ation are enough to make rms turn from
22pricing in rubles to pricing in dollars. This result holds disregarding of the currency in which the
input price is denominated. The intuition for the result is straightforward: with the higher market
power it is less costly for an individual rm to deviate from the group. Thus, a more moderate
rate of in
ation is sucient for a rm to nd it benecial to turn, even individually, to pricing
in dollars, which allows to avoid frequent price adjustment. Hence, identical rms start pricing in
dollars, and the economy falls into the dollar-pricing equilibrium at a lower rate of in
ation.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that in Moscow during the early years of transition, prices for
a number of goods, including clothing, sport equipment, furniture, etc., were being denominated
almost uniformly in dollars in the expensive shops, and mainly in rubles in the cheaper shops and
markets. Furthermore, prices for the domestic products of high quality in the expensive shops
were often denominated in dollars, while prices for the low quality imports in the cheap shops and
markets were usually set in rubles. These informal observations are consistent with the predictions
of the model, as expensive goods are generally less homogeneous and less competitive.
It is also seen from Table 4 that, in the framework of this model, we cannot make any predictions
concerning the in
uence of the market power on the exit from equilibrium with uniform dollar
pricing without making more concrete assumptions about the shape of the demand function. The
sign of
@^ RD
@ can be determined only after choosing some form of explicit relation between the




The model predicts that not only the relation between the rate of in
ation and the exchange rate
volatility is important in determining the optimal choice of the price-setting currency made by an
individual rm, but so are the pricing strategies of the rm's competitors and its input suppliers.
It is shown, that in the partly dollarized environment, where rms can choose between pricing
in rubles and pricing in dollars two equilibria exist: an equilibrium with uniform ruble pricing in the
industry, and an equilibrium with uniform dollar pricing. The relation between the ranges of these
two equilibria is determined by the pricing strategy of the input suppliers and by the assumption
about the curvature of the demand function.
The model is capable to capture the hysteresis eect: it is shown, that under the non-constant
23elasticity of demand, the in
ation rate which is needed to make rms switch from the equilibrium
with ruble pricing to the equilibrium with dollar pricing exceeds the rate of in
ation under which
rms can exit from the dollar pricing equilibrium and turn back to pricing in rubles. It is also shown
that exit from the equilibrium with uniform dollar pricing is possible only when the input price is
denominated in rubles; when input price is denominated in dollars no rm will turn individually
from pricing in dollars back to pricing in rubles even if the in
ation rate is reduced to zero.
Finally, the model predicts that in the industries with lower competition a lower in
ation rate
is needed to make rms fall into the equilibrium with uniform dollar pricing.
Appendices
A Small 
uctuations of desired relative price




P and the relative input price PI
















































































With a non-increasing mark-up function, the rate of change in mark-up at unity,
M0(1)
M(1) , is non-









 1. Therefore, small deviations of the relative
input price PI
P from unity are associated with only small 





24B Derivation of formulas (11)-(13)




P in logs, and taking into




i   p =  ln M(1) + ln M(P
#
i =P) + pI   p: (22)
We then approximate ln M(P
#
i =P) by Taylor with respect to log desired relative price p
#
i   pi in
the neighborhood of unity desired relative price:
ln M(P
#






































Substituting this approximation into the equation (22) we obtain:
p
#
































Finally, we dene  = 1
1 M0(1)
M(1)
, and, hence, get the following equation for the instantaneous












The relation between the rate of change in the desired mark-up at the unity desired relative
price
M0(1)
















C Approximation for prot losses, formulas (14) - (15)
To derive an approximation for the prot losses from price non-optimality we expand the prot






































































Therefore, the instantaneous prot losses are equal to
(P
#

























Here the log instantaneously desired relative price p
#
i   p is determined by the relation (22), and





























































i =P)   1
#
: (26)
Again, remaining agnostic about the exact functional forms of (Pi=P) and M(Pi=P) which are











, we approximate these values by
Taylor. For the purposes of getting a second order Taylor approximation for the prot losses the








and the rst order approximation for p
#
i are sucient.








is obtained from (26), where, for convenience, we














+ (1)   1

+ o(1): (27)
The rst order approximation for p
#
i is given by (23):
p
#







Substituting relations (27) and (28) into the expression (25) for the instantaneous prot losses from
price non-optimality we get the following second order approximation for the losses:
(P
#
i =P)   (Pi=P) = K 

pi   (1   )p    pI
2
+ o2 , (29)
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i   p)   (p
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Under the assumption of small values of (p
#
i   pi) and (pI   p), and the resultant closeness
to zero of (p
#
i   p), the residual term o2 is negligibly small in comparison with the main term
K 

pi   (1   )p   pI
2
.








i =P) 1 , and the equa-
tion (24), which relates the rate of change in the desired mark-up around unity to the elasticity of







D Solution to the optimization problems (17) and (19)
Here we investigate in detail the case when both, the price of the competitors and the input price
are being set in rubles. The other cases, when either rm's competitors, or input suppliers, or both
of them denominate prices in dollars are treated in a similar way.
When both the rm's competitors and input suppliers quote their prices in rubles we have
pt = pI







  n X
k=0
LRub







k (pik) = E0
(k+1) Z
k
K  (pik   t)2 dt: (31)
The optimal reset price for the period between the k   th and (k + 1)   th price changes pik is
found by solving
LRub
k (pik) = E0
(k+1) Z
k
K  (pik   t)2 dt ! min
pik
:
27Solving the rst order condition
(k+1) R
k










It is easy then to calculate the rm's prot losses from price non-optimality during the period







Note that losses in the latter expression do not depend on the number of period k. This is because
the exchange rate does not enter rm's optimization problem in the particular case we are consid-
ering, and the in
ation rate is steady. Substituting this expression into (30) for the total prot


























































K  (et + p
f
ik   t)2 dt: (33)
In this problem distribution of the exchange rate matters. We need the rst and second moments
of the log exchange rate to solve the problem. From (8), using e0 = 0, we have:
E0(et) = t;
E0(e2






28The optimal reset dollar price is found by minimizing LDoll
k (p
f











ik = 0 for any k:
Substituting the zero log optimal reset price into expression (33) for the expected prot losses
from price non-optimality during the period between the k-th and (k + 1)-th price changes, and














Unlike the previous case, here the expected losses from price non-optimality between the k-th and
(k + 1)-th price changes depend on k. This is because the uncertainty about future values of the
exchange rate, as of moment t = 0, increases with time, and, respectively, expected prot losses
are bigger for the later periods.
Using (35) we can calculate rm's total expected prot losses per unit of time:
LossDoll(p
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